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Abraham S. Alter, Esq. 
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Susan J. Reiss, Esq. 
Social Security Administration 
Office of General counsel – Region II 
Room 3904 
26 Federal Plaza 
New York, NY 10278-0000 
 
Counsel for Appellee 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Wayne Smith appeals from an Order of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirming a 
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.  That 
decision denied Smith‘s claims for disability insurance 
benefits and supplemental security income under the Social 
Security Act.  Smith contends that the hypothetical question 
posed by the administrative law judge (―ALJ‖) to the 
vocational expert did not sufficiently convey all of Smith‘s 
limitations, and that as a result, the Commissioner‘s decision 
was not supported by substantial evidence.  We will affirm. 
 
I.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 
405(g).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Our review is limited to determining whether there 
was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner‘s 
decision to deny benefits.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  ―Substantial 
evidence has been defined as more than a mere scintilla.  It 
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‖  Reefer v. 
Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Commissioner‘s findings of 
fact are binding if they are supported by substantial evidence.  
Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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II.  Applicable Law 
 An individual is disabled for purposes of the Social 
Security Act (―SSA‖) only if his ―physical or mental 
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not 
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering 
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other 
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national 
economy.‖  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).  In making this 
determination, an ALJ must perform a five-step, sequential 
analysis.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.  The ALJ must review (1) the 
claimant‘s current work activity; (2) the medical severity and 
duration of the claimant‘s impairments; (3) whether the 
claimant‘s impairments meet or equal the requirements of an 
impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant 
has the residual functional capacity to return to past relevant 
work; and (5) if the claimant cannot return to past relevant 
work, whether he or she can ―make an adjustment to other 
work‖ in the national economy.  20 C.F.R. § 
404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).  The claimant bears the burden of proof 
at steps one through four, and the Commissioner bears the 
burden of proof at step five.  Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
 Under the Social Security regulations, ―a vocational 
expert or specialist may offer expert opinion testimony in 
response to a hypothetical question about whether a person 
with the physical and mental limitations imposed by the 
claimant‘s medical impairment(s) can meet the demands of 
the claimant‘s previous work.‖  20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2).  
While ―the ALJ must accurately convey to the vocational 
expert all of a claimant‘s credibly established limitations,‖ 
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005), 
―[w]e do not require an ALJ to submit to the vocational expert 
every impairment alleged by a claimant.‖  Id.  Thus, the ALJ 
is bound to convey only those impairments ―that are medically 
established.‖  Id.   
 
III.  Background 
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A.  Procedural Overview 
 Smith filed applications for disability insurance 
benefits and supplemental security income on August 18, 
2004, alleging that he was disabled as of October 19, 2003.  
The application was denied initially, and on reconsideration.  
Smith requested a hearing before an ALJ, and the hearing was 
held before ALJ Donna A. Krappa.  On November 20, 2007, 
the ALJ issued a decision finding — at step four of the 
sequential analysis — that Smith had sufficient residual 
functional capacity to return to his past relevant work as a 
warehouse worker or a loader or unloader of trucks.  The 
Appeals Council denied Smith‘s request for review of that 
decision, and on May 15, 2009, the District Court affirmed.  
Smith timely appealed.   
 
B.  The Hearing Before the ALJ 
 Smith argues that the hypothetical question posed to 
the vocational expert, Rocco Meola, did not fully reflect the 
medical conclusions of three medical experts:  Dr. M. Graff, 
Dr. Benito Tan, and Dr. Daniel Edelman.  This argument 
lacks merit. 
1. Dr. Tan 
 Dr. Tan completed a Form SSA-4734-BK-SUP (a 
―Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment‖) on 
February 10, 2005.  Section I of the Form, ―Summary 
Conclusions,‖ requires that the person filling it out select one 
of the following options for twenty psychological attributes:  
―Not Significantly Limited,‖ ―Moderately Limited,‖ 
―Markedly Limited,‖ ―No Evidence of Limitation in this 
Category,‖ or ―Not Ratable on Available Evidence.‖  Dr. Tan 
found that Smith was ―Not Significantly Limited‖ for fourteen 
attributes and ―Moderately Limited‖ for the following six:  
 
ability to understand and remember detailed 
instructions 
 
ability to carry out detailed instructions 
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ability to maintain attention and concentration 
for extended periods 
 
ability to complete a normal workday and 
workweek without interruption from 
psychologically based symptoms and to perform 
at a consistent pace without an unreasonable 
number and length of rest periods 
 
ability to accept instructions and respond 
appropriately to criticism from supervisors 
   
ability to respond appropriately to changes in 
the work setting. 
 
(App. 217-18.)  In Section III of the Form, ―Functional 
Capacity Assessment,‖ Dr. Tan wrote that Smith ―is able to 
follow instructions, maintain pace/persistence, concentration 
and attention, relate appropriately and adapt, in work 
settings.‖  (Id. 219.) 
 
2.  Dr. Graff 
 Dr. Graff completed a Mental Residual Functional 
Capacity Assessment on December 21, 2005.  Dr. Graff 
selected ―Not Significantly Limited‖ for ten attributes and 
―Moderately Limited‖ for the following ten: 
 
ability to understand and remember detailed 
instructions 
 
ability to carry out detailed instructions 
 
ability to maintain attention and concentration 
for extended periods 
 
ability to perform activities within a schedule, 
maintain regular attendance and be punctual 
within customary tolerances  
 
ability to work in coordination with or 
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proximity to others without being distracted by 
them 
 
ability to complete a normal workday and 
workweek without interruption from 
psychologically based symptoms and to perform 
at a consistent pace without an unreasonable 
number and length of rest periods 
 
ability to ask simple questions or request 
assistance 
 
ability to accept instructions and respond 
appropriately to criticism from supervisors 
 
ability to get along with coworkers or peers 
without distracting them or exhibiting 
behavioral extremes 
 
ability to set realistic goals or make plans 
independently of others. 
 
(Id. 278-79.)  In Section III of the form, Dr. Graff directed the 
reader to another form completed on that date, in which he 
wrote the following assessment: 
 
It appears that the claimant suffers from 
depressive symptoms that are no more than mild 
to moderate.  His social interaction abilities are 
severely impaired, but, overall, he does not meet 
or equal a listing. 
 
The claimant is capable of at least entry-level 
work in a setting with minimal interpersonal 
contact. 
 
(Id. 282.) 
3. Dr. Edelman 
 Dr. Daniel Edelman completed a psychological 
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evaluation of Smith on July 18, 2005, and reached the 
following conclusions: 
 
Claimant can follow and understand simple 
directions and instructions and perform simple 
tasks independently.  He may have difficulty, at 
present, maintaining attention and concentration 
for tasks of significant complexity.  He cannot 
presently maintain a regular schedule.  He 
would have difficulty, at present, learning new 
tasks.  He would have difficulty, at present, 
performing select complex tasks.  He cannot, at 
present, make appropriate decisions, relate 
adequately with others, or appropriately deal 
with stress.  Difficulties are caused by 
depression.  
 
(Id. 229.) 
4.  The Hypothetical Question 
 Near the end of the hearing, the ALJ took testimony 
from Rocco Meola, a vocational expert.  After confirming that 
Meola had reviewed the case file, the ALJ posed the 
following hypothetical question: 
 
ALJ: I‘d like to assume a person the claimant‘s 
age, education and work history.  And 
further assume that this individual is 
limited to medium work, simple, routine, 
repetitive, one or two-step tasks and jobs 
where they would just have occasional 
interaction with the public or coworkers.  
Given this hypothetical individual, could 
this person perform the past relevant 
work of the claimant?   
  
VE: He could do the job of loading and 
unloading truck [sic] as he did it.  And 
general warehouse work is also — would 
meet the classification. 
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(Id. 65.) 
 Counsel for Smith asked Meola about the various 
respects in which Dr. Graff and Dr. Tan had concluded that 
Smith was ―moderately limited‖ in Section I of the Mental 
Residual Functional Capacity Assessment.  After the ALJ 
directed counsel to provide Meola a definition of ―moderate,‖ 
Meola suggested that ―moderate‖ might mean ―that the person 
is not preclud[ed] from doing the activity, but does not do it at 
a level that would be consistent with what‘s acceptable in a 
national workforce.‖  (Id. 67-68.)  If Smith were so limited in 
all the respects noted by Dr. Graff and Dr. Tan, Meola 
testified, Smith would not be able to return to his past relevant 
work.  
 
III.  Discussion 
 Smith‘s argument on appeal is that the hypothetical 
question posed by the ALJ to Meola failed to take account of 
all the limitations noted by Dr. Tan, Dr. Graff, and Dr. 
Edelman, such that Meola‘s answer cannot constitute 
―substantial evidence.‖ 
 
A.  Dr. Tan and Dr. Graff 
 Smith‘s main argument is that the hypothetical 
question did not sufficiently include Dr. Tan‘s and Dr. Graff‘s 
conclusions that Smith was ―moderately limited‖ in the 
various areas that they noted in Section I of the Mental 
Residual Functional Capacity Assessment.  As the Social 
Security Administration‘s guidelines (the ―Program 
Operations Manual System,‖ or ―POMS‖) explain, however, 
―Section I is merely a worksheet to aid in deciding the 
presence and degree of functional limitations and the 
adequacy of documentation and does not constitute the RFC 
assessment.‖  POMS DI 24510.060, available at 
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424510060 
(emphasis added).  Numerous district courts in this circuit 
have recognized this point and held that Section I of the form 
may be assigned little or no weight.  See Molloy v. Astrue, No. 
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08-4801, 2010 WL 421090, at *11 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2010) 
(―According to the Social Security Administration‘s internal 
operating guidelines . . . , this section of the examination form 
does not constitute the RFC assessment but rather is merely a 
worksheet to aid employees.  Therefore, [the ALJ] was not 
required to assign any weight to this part of the report because 
it was not the final RFC finding.‖ (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)); Liggett v. Astrue, No. 08-1913, 2009 
WL 189934, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2009) (explaining that 
―Dr. Chiampi‘s actual mental residual functional capacity 
assessment [was located] in Part III of the Mental Residual 
Functional Capacity Form‖ and that ―the undersigned does 
not accept the ‗summary conclusions‘ in Part I as the 
assessment of the claimant‘s mental residual functional 
capacity here‖); Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-1951, 
2008 WL 5244384, at *12 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2008) (―[T]he 
check blocks in Section I of the assessment do not constitute 
the assessment itself, but function rather as a worksheet to aid 
the physician in making an assessment.  Therefore, the ALJ's 
hypothetical accurately reflected [the doctors‘] opinion of 
Plaintiff‘s condition.‖ (citation omitted)).  The District Court 
also understood this point.  See Smith v. Astrue, No. 08 Civ. 
2875, 2009 WL 1372536, at *5 (D.N.J. May 15, 2009) (―As 
the Commissioner correctly notes, Section I is not the actual 
Residual Functional Capacity (‗RFC‘) assessment, but rather 
a worksheet to aid in determining the presence and degree of 
functional limitations.  Instead, the actual mental RFC 
assessment is found in Section III of the Form.‖). 
 
 Parenthetically, it bears noting that the definition of 
―moderate limitation‖ assumed by Meola is incorrect, as the 
Social Security Administration has provided a specific 
definition of the term in the context of the Mental Residual 
Functional Capacity Assessment.  See POMS DI 
24510.063(B)(2),  available at  
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424510063 
(indicating that ―moderately limited‖ should be selected when 
―the individual‘s capacity to perform the activity is 
impaired‖).  The definition does not require that the 
individual‘s capacity be at a level that is unacceptable in a 
national workforce; rather, the instructions specify that ―[t]he 
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degree and extent of the capacity or limitation must be 
described in narrative format in Section III.‖  Id.   
 
 Because Smith cannot rely on the worksheet 
component of the Mental Residual Functional Capacity 
Assessment to contend that the hypothetical question was 
deficient, his argument is without merit as it pertains to Dr. 
Tan and Dr. Graff. 
 
B.  Dr. Edelman 
 Smith also contends that the hypothetical question 
failed to include the conclusions of Dr. Edelman, a contention 
that was not presented to the District Court.  Although 
Smith‘s brief on appeal is in many respects indistinguishable 
from the brief that he filed in the District Court, the section 
discussing Dr. Edelman is entirely new.  Dr. Edelman‘s name 
does not appear even once in the brief that Smith filed in the 
District Court, nor does it appear even once in the opinion of 
the District Court.  Smith‘s failure to raise any argument as to 
Dr. Edelman in that Court operates to waive that argument 
here.  See, e.g., Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (―This court has consistently held that it will not 
consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.‖).1  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.   
 
                                                 
1
 In any event, we note that Dr. Edelman concluded that Smith 
could ―follow and understand simple directions and 
instructions and perform simple tasks independently.‖  (App. 
229.)  While Dr. Edelman found that Smith would have 
difficulty with ―tasks of significant complexity,‖ ―learning 
new tasks,‖ or ―deal[ing] with stress‖ (id.), the hypothetical 
question presumed that Smith was only capable of ―simple, 
routine, repetitive, one or two-step tasks‖ (App. 65), language 
largely consistent with the limitations noted by Dr. Edelman. 
